Operation Market Garden

Operation Market Garden (September 17–September 25, 1944) was an Allied military operation in World War II. Its tactical objectives were to secure a series of bridges over the main rivers of the German-occupied Netherlands by large-scale use of airborne forces together with a rapid advance by armored units along the connecting roads, for the strategic purpose of allowing an Allied crossing of the Rhine river, the last major natural barrier to an advance into Germany. The planned rapid advance from the Dutch-Belgian border into northern Germany, across the Maas (Meuse) and two arms of the Rhine (the Waal and the Lower Rhine), would have outflanked the Siegfried Line and made possible an encirclement of the Ruhr Area, Germany's industrial heartland.

After major defeats in Normandy in July to August 1944, remnants of German forces withdrew across the Low Countries and eastern France towards the German border by the end of August. In the north, the British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was advancing on a line running from Antwerp to the northern border of Belgium. The First Canadian Army was just finishing their own offensive northward along the coast and were too fatigued to take part in major actions. To their south, the U.S. 12th Army Group under General Omar Bradley was nearing the German border and had been ordered to orient on the Aachen gap with the U.S. First Army. In the south, the U.S. 6th Army Group under General Jacob L. Devers was advancing towards Germany after their landings in southern France.

Following the British and Canadian breakout from Caen and the closure of the Falaise pocket, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, favoured a broad advance eastwards to the Rhine across a wide front, combined with capture and clearance of the Channel ports and Antwerp (Hibbert 1998, p. 8). This strategy was contested by the field commanders, especially Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery who commanded the British 21st Army Group in the north, and General George Patton, commander of the US 3rd Army in the south. Both favored rapid, concentrated thrusts across the Rhine in their own sectors. With the supply situation deteriorating in early September, a broad advance became impossible; there were not enough supplies moving forward to keep all of the armies in "combat supply".